Today's FCC is not as well structured to handle the reality of its spectrum policy workload as the early Commission was and may not be even keeping up with workload. Indeed, there is increasing evidence that "triage" is a key issue in spectrum policy. That is the nontransparent decision to even address an issue is a major determinant of its outcome. This could be both deterring capital formation for new spectrum technology R&D as well as creating real risks for incumbent licensees since emerging interference issues that need rulemaking or nonroutine action are not getting resolved in a timely way.
Introduction
This paper reviews the ability of FCC to deal with spectrum policy issues both when it was created in 1934 and today. Much of the style and format of today's spectrum regulations and FCC's deliberation style were created at its very beginning by FCC and its predecessors. While these approaches to developing regulations may have been adequate then in keeping up with technology and demands, recent backlogs and delays raise serious questions about whether they are still adequate today. The explosion of spectrum technology after World War II happened at the same time the Administrative Procedures Act complicated the adoption of regulations and ensuing case law slowly complicated it more in an ever increasing way.
While the present hyperpartisanship and congressional gridlock makes new legislation to address this issue unlikely, the paper describes several options that could be implemented within existing legislation. However, low funding of FCC spectrum policy activities remains a major issue -one that industry appears to have had little interest in to date.
What has changed since 1934?
In this section we will discuss that legal and technology changes that have happened since 1934. This is to show that while the FCC may have been able to keep up with its technical Title III jurisdiction in its early years, these changes have made it increasingly challenging to keep up today as FCC is currently operating.
Organization Issues
The The whole Commission shall have and exercise jurisdiction over all matters not herein specifically allocated to a division; over all matters which fall within the jurisdiction of two or more of the divisions established by this order; and over the assignment of bands of frequencies to various radio services. In any case where a conflict arises as to the jurisdiction of any division or where jurisdiction of any matter or serviced is not allocated to a division, the Commission shall determine whether the whole Commission or a division thereof shall have and exercise such jurisdiction."
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Where did this concept of dividing the commissioners into 3 parallel "divisions" or "minicommissions" come from? From ones of its parents: the Interstate Commerce By an act of Congress approved August 19, 1917, we were authorized to divide our membership into as many divisions as might be deemed necessary, and to assign or refer any of our work, business, or functions to a division for action. Divisions so constituted were, by the act, given authority by a majority thereof to prosecute and conclude matters so assigned or referred with the same effect as if the resulting action had been taken by the Commission, subject to rehearing by the Commission itself."
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The ICC started with 3 divisions with stated responsibilities in 1927 and by 1920 had increased the number to 5. The number of ICC commissioners changed over the years starting at 7, ending at its demise in1996 at 5, but reaching 10 in 1920. While FCC does not have the specific provisions of the 1917 legislation that allowed its parent to divide its work, it actually had broader provisions in Section 5(c) of the 1934 Act which remains in its original wording today. These provisions allow the Commission to delegate most of its functions to "panel of commissioners, an individual commissioner, an employee board, or an individual employee" with the Commission retaining en banc review/reconsideration rights.
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The limited delegations of authority in Part 0, Subpart B of the Commission's Rules were adopted pursuant to the terms of §5(c) and delegate limited powers to various bureau and office chiefs as well as the Defense Commissioner.
(In theory any commissioner could be designated as the Defense Commissioner, but for more than 20 years only the Chairman has held this position.)
The division structure of the FCC was abolished on November 13, 1937 after "it was found that to subdivide a small commission in such a manner had a devisive (sic) effect and was not conducive to cooperation and mutual understanding among the members of the Commission". . That NOI itself has never been acted on by FCC in the past 6 year despite the fact that its announcement by FCC included this statement of its importance:
"Innovation in wireless, an increasingly significant part of the communications sector, can be an engine for near-term economic recovery and long-term economic growth. In furtherance of this goal, the NOI seeks comment broadly on all ideas that will foster wireless innovation and investment."
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The inaction of FCC on this NOI with its lofty spectrum goals is a very visible symptom of FCC's present inability to deal with its spectrum policy agenda.
Technology & Industry Changes
The status of the spectrum-related industries at the Commission's beginning is well documented in the Commission's first annual report.
-On June 30, 1935 there were 632 broadcast stations, 1011 experimental stations, and 303 land mobile licenses -almost all of which were public safety.
-The highest frequency in nonexperimental use was "30,000 kc" or what would be called today 30 MHz.
-In the whole country there were only 20 directional antennas because at the frequencies in use then such antennas would have to be very large. While the pioneering Yagi-Uda directional antenna 12 , the basis of most TV receiver antennas and many other directional antennas, has already been invented and patented in Japan and the US by the 1930s, it was not in practical use until World War II and was little known in the 1930s. Thus spectrum policy issues related to antenna technology and issues such effective radiated power were of no concern to the early FCC. Thus spectrum policy deliberations at the early FCC had many fewer dimensions than today and there were 3 "mini-FCCs" to split the work load of these deliberations and they could work with legal procedures that were much more expeditious than today's which must comply with both the 1946 APA and the case law that now accompanies it.
It is indeed ironic that just as an explosion of new wireless technologies and ever increasing frequencies became available in the aftermath of World War II the APA appeared and started, slowly at first but more and more as its case law accumulated, decreasing the productivity of FCC spectrum deliberations. As is shown in the next section there is now a major mismatch between FCC's productivity in technical spectrum policy as it is presently operating and funded and the requirements of today's spectrum related Spectrum Policy Productivity Shortfall
Delegation of Authority Limits
The path started down by FCC in the 1930s leaves most policy decisions to the Commission to decide en banc and has limited delegated authority to the staff, thus making very sparing use of the options conveyed by §5(c). For example, the power delegated to the Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau by §0.331 with respect to rulemakings, such as those needed to allow a new technology or to create service rules in a new band (whether or not it poses any interference risk to any incumbent), state: "The Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau shall not have the authority to act upon notices of proposed rulemaking and inquiry, final orders in rulemaking proceedings and inquiry proceedings, and reports arising from any of the foregoing except such orders involving ministerial conforming amendments to rule parts, or orders conforming any of the applicable rules to formally adopted international conventions or agreements where novel questions of fact, law, or policy are not involved."
14
The Chief, Office of Engineering and Technology has the following limitations in his delegated authority with respect to issues that must be referred to the Commission en banc:
"Any other petition, pleading or request presenting new or novel questions of fact, law, or policy which cannot be resolved under outstanding precedents and guidelines. Petitions and other requests for declaratory rulings, when such petitions or requests contain new or novel arguments not previously considered by the Commission or preset facts or arguments which appear to justify a change in Commission policy."
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The delegations to other bureau/office chiefs have similar limitations that focus on the novelty of the issue involved not whether it is controversial or if it will adversely impact any party or if the timeliness impact of consideration by the Commission en banc is cost effective in any public interest manner.
We note that, by contrast, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) does not condition its delegations of authority to senior staff under its counterpart 16 of Section 5(c) to prevent staff from acting on all "novel" issues. For example, the Director of NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatory has among his delegated authorities the ability to "amendments to licenses changing the technical specifications for utilization and production facilities" and to "issue orders for imposing requirements and other appropriate orders for modification, suspension, and revocation of licenses, concerning: (a) the manufacture, construction, and operation of utilization and production facilities" FCC is modeled as a single server because it is similar to a bank with only one teller and all customers seeking interaction must wait for the attention of the one teller.
However, unlike a bank where customers expect first in first out (FIFO) treatment, the ordering/prioritization of FCC actions is certainly not FIFO -which in itself is a real transparency issue at FCC. However, the length of the queue/backlog is independent of FIFO and basically depends on the ration of the arrival rate λ to the service rate μ.
While in queuing theory this usually implies Poisson arrival rates and exponential service times, in general if μ < λ queues will build up indefinitely due to undercapacity. At least the Patent Office resolves most applications before it without dismissing them for being stale and has clear procedures for such dismissals. FCC is required by both §7(a) "to encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the public" and by §303(g) to "generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public 22 37 C.F.R. The 11 examples given by Lazarus are: Table I : "The Lazarus 11"
Why did these proceedings take years to be resolved? Despite being uncontroversial, they also did not have a broad base of support and if the demand for spectrum decision making at FCC exceeds capacity, then something has to go to the back of the queue! But sometimes such proceedings are handled in a timely way and sometimes they are not, leading again to transparency issues.
Wireless Innovation NOI -Docket 09-157:
As mentioned previously, this proceeding was launched with great fanfare early in who had invested resources to solve the problem faced competition from Asian manufacturers whose less expensive products were still permitted although they had taken no steps to address the problem. Thus the delay became a lose/lose situation for all parties involved except the overseas manufacturers who continues to make equipment that contributed to the ongoing interference.
FM/LTE Interference Issue
This issue is a cousin in many ways to the Docket 10-4 issue. Commission's only public statements on the problem have been obscure enforcement notices, none of which appear to have ever been resolved. Why has the usually aggressive CTIA been strangely silent in this case and rather low key in later phases of Docket 10-4? The author's hypothesis is that CTIA has been implicitly or explicitly told by the Commission staff that given the low throughput of spectrum policy decision making capacity at FCC, CTIA can choose between resolving future spectrum needs below 6 GHz or resolving interference issue, but can not get both.
Police Radar Detector/VSAT Interference (Docket 01-278)
Like the previous example of FM/LTE interference, this example involves another type of interference that is counterintuitive. Police radar detectors are nominally passive receivers intended to warn drivers of nearby police radars enforcing speed limits. (They are illegal in cars in 20+ states including Virginia.
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) The local oscillator, a subsystem in the receiver, in many of the detectors at the time of this rulemaking generated a "local oscillator (LO)" signal at 11 GHz that was combined with over-the-air signals arrival at the unit's antenna. While the 11 GHz LO signal was not intended to be radiated, it was radiated in the designs in several detectors resulting in interference to VSAT receivers at the same frequency. So while the time from the NPRM to the initial rules 36 in this proceeding was only 8 months, this simple chronology overlooks the greater than a decade "latency" before spectrum policy resources were able to focus on the problem. This latency is greater than the comparable latency in the Docket 10-4 case of 5 years from the first formal notification of CTIA about the problem to the issuance of the NPRM. There is no paper trail at FCC of when the VSAT problem was first noticed or when satellite operators first complained to FCC.
While immediate rulemaking should not be the response to every report of a new interference mechanism, these cellular booster and radar detector multiyear delays -both dealing with interference to major licensees -are a clear symptom of major throughput problems in the Commission's spectrum policy deliberations.
"The War on Millimeterwave Spectrum"
This is a concept coined by the author 37 to describe the Commission's backlog on policy issues dealing with spectrum issues above 60 GHz. At present FCC spectrum allocations go up to 275 GHz, but specific service rules only go up to 95 GHz, with 35 For example FEMA responders to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing experienced interference to their emergency VSAT system they brought to the site, which was close to a major highway that was undamaged and still carrying traffic. While it was never proven this interference was due to radar detector emissions, it closely matched previous cases. 
Reallocation of Spectrum for CMRS
CTIA recently published a report stating that "it takes 13 years on average to reallocate spectrum for wireless (sic) use". (Presumably by "wireless" they meant CMRS use since CTIA calls itself "The Wireless Association" although lexicographers have not fully endorsed this redefinition.) The following table is a summary of CTIA's data: Not shown in the table, though discussed in the underlying report, is the fact that many of these reallocations depended on converting Federal Government (G) spectrum into Non-Federal Government (NG) spectrum which was beyond the FCC's complete control due to the FCC/NTIA dichotomy resulting from Sections 301 and 305 of the Communications Act.
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Needless to say, there is enough blame to go around between 42 CTIA, "From Proposal to Deployment: The History of Spectrum Allocation Timelines", 2015 (http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/072015-spectrum-timelines-whitepaper.pdf) 43 
Options for Change
The challenge of the above mentioned CMRS reallocations is a major issue for FCC and is also a major contributor to the spectrum policy overload. These reallocations are the type of issues that made the drafters of the Communications Act call for a bipartisan commission of presidential appointees to control communications policy. But does that mean that these presidential appointees need hands-on micromanagement of all spectrum policy issues? It appears that this insistence for such detailed control by the 5 commissioners has resulted in the spectrum policy overload where productivity does not match the workload. Consider the recent decision mentioned above on reconsideration of the experimental rules.
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Is there anything in this noncontroversial correction of the Report and Order adopted 2 ½ years earlier that really needed the attention of 5 presidential appointees? Did their attention to this decision add value to the process or merely delay it? Is it possible to improve the productivity of the FCC in spectrum policy by changing it from a single server queue to a multiserver queue? Can this be done with assuring that the issues needing the insight of presidential appointees gets such attention while other more ministerial and technocratic issues get more expedite service?
In this section we discuss options for improving FCC productivity in spectrum policy. 44 MO&O&FNPRM, Docket 10-236, July 6,2015 (http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0708/FCC-15-76A1.pdf)
Lazarus Suggestions
We previously included a table of delayed proceedings from Mitchell Lazarus' pro se filing in Docket 09-157. Mr. Lazarus also made several suggestions in those comments. Here are the five specific suggestions he made:
• Simplify procedures for technical proceedings that lack major social or economic impact.
• Apply streamlined treatment to proceedings for benign technologies.
• Curtail the ex parte process • Release a brief supplemental NPRM on tentative decisions.
• Bifurcate non-controversial issues Lazarus admits that his first suggestion probably needs new legislation in view of the APA and its case law. While this is a high hurdle, we note that on several occasions commissioners have suggested an exemption for FCC from some of the terms of the Government in Sunshine Act.
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The remaining four suggestions may not require new legislation and could be implemented by the Commission if it so chooses.
IEEE-USA Suggestions

IEEE-USA
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, the US element of the electrical engineering professional society submitted to the Commission a set of recommendations 47 in November 2012 that attracted no interest or even a reply. Here are several of the recommendations that are within the power of FCC to implement:
FCC and NTIA should explicitly acknowledge the role of Section 7 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and the intent of Congress to encourage new communications technology and services. These agencies should adopt transparent procedures for determining which innovations are subject to this statute and should make readily available information on such proceedings. The FCC and NTIA should recommend changes in the statute in a timely way, if the current terms of Section 7 are deemed not practical. It is interesting to note that the independent FCC has not publicly complained about its budget situation. It is obligated to submit its budget proposals to OMB for review but no law requires the Chairman and commissioners to defend OMB's determinations. In recent memory no FCC regulatee has ever appeared at a congressional appropriations hearing for FCC to ask for either an increase or decrease of FCC's budget although such practice happens for other agencies.
While CTIA and NAB opposed the FCC's recent "Field Modernization" cutback of spectrum enforcement, they did not speak out publicly on the pending FY2016 budget that was the root cause of the cutback. Regulated industries would benefit in real ways from timely FCC spectrum policy determinations and need to get involved in the budget process both with OMB and congressional appropriations committees.
Entrepreneurial firms, in particular, need timely resolution of FCC deliberations on new technology before their funding dries up.
This problem is not new. In its Fourth Annual Report the Commission wrote "To remedy this situation of understaffing, overload, and accumulation, as well as to provide more adequate and effective facilities for regulation, the Commission has recommended this year a substantial increase in its budget."
A major change in funding is needed to get spectrum policy back on track but the impact on regulated industries will be negligible compared to their total cash flows since the current FY106 budget request is $388M.
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An increase of $50-100M would be affordable in an environment where the cellular industry has revenues of about $190B, the broadcast industry has revenues of about $200B, and the telephone/ISP sector probably has comparable revenues -putting the total revenues of FCC-regulated industries in the $500B range.
Conclusions
FCC's spectrum policy decision-making throughput may have been adequate in 1934, but due to technical and legal changes since then the throughput is inadequate given the demands of today's industry. The causes of this throughput gap are both organizational and funding issues. The decision making structure of FCC may be appropriate for parts of its jurisdiction, but fail to produce the capacity needed in the rapidly evolving spectrum area. Even the cellular industry, which has replaced the broadcast industry as the prodigal child at FCC, appears to have to choose whether it wants FCC attention for its spectrum needs or its interference problems. New technologies with long term potential have serious trouble getting timely attention at FCC.
A series of proposals, some from the author and some from other sources, are presented to address this issue. Most can be implemented without new legislation although several need or would benefit from increased FCC funding. Reasonable people could disagree on which proposals are most practical, but the key issue is to acknowledge that the undercapacity is present with the current FCC operating methods 58 FCC Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Estimates Submitted to Congress February 2015 (https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-331817A1.pdf)
